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Japan's labor market faces a number of problems, some the direct consequences of the macroeconomic malaise in the years 
since the early 1990s and others of a more long-term nature.  Identifying and analyzing the key issues is the purpose of this 
chapter.  This provides the basis for a discussion of possible ways to promote a healthier and more nimble labor market in 
Japan.  For some problems, we discuss concrete proposals, for others we identify issues that must be addressed to facilitate 
formulation of sensible solutions. 
   For context, the chapter begins by summarizing trends and current conditions in Japan's labor market.  Four 
problems closely related to the poor performance of the economy, which means a restoration of growth will mitigate ⎯ although 
not "solve" ⎯ them, are then addressed.  These problems, which can be called near-term, are job training and worker 
satisfaction, youth idleness, gender gaps in unemployment, and regional variation in unemployment.  We then turn to more 
deep-rooted issues that involve institutional structures, social preferences, and demographic trends.  The institutional and 
structural issues addressed are the dual economy, sectoral changes, and re-allocation of human resources; dependency on 
government sectors for employment; the industrial relations system; and working hours.  Issues related to demographic trends, 
including immigration policy and mandatory retirement, are then taken up.  In analyzing the status and role of women in the 
work force, we take particular note of the disincentives that laws, public policies, and employer practices generate. 
 
 
1  Trends and Current Conditions 
 
Japan saw its unemployment rate rise more than 2.5 times between 1990 (when the rate was 2.1%) and 2002 (5.4%), with the 
rate of increase accelerating after the late 1990’s (Figure 10.1).  At this writing (October 2004), it appears the number of 
unemployed peaked when the unemployment rate reached 5.5% in January 2003, but the issues we consider in this chapter 
remain valid even if the economy continues to recover. 
  Figure 10.1 also indicates that the steady-state rate of unemployment (also called the natural rate of unemployment 
or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)), rose substantially, going from 2.4% in 1991 to 3.9% in 2001 
(OECD 2003, Table 1.3.)  Such a large increase points to structural changes in the economy rather than cyclical influences.  
Indeed, Japan is one of only 5 OECD countries that experienced an increase in the natural rate of unemployment between 
1991 and 2001.  (The NAIRU rose by 62.5% in Japan, 26.5% in Finland, 18% in Greece, 13% in Iceland, and 8.9% in 
Germany.)  The NAIRU in 4 countries ⎯ Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States) remained stable ⎯ and it decreased 
in 12 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK). 
  The poorly performing economy has led to labor market problems that have had different effects between the sexes 
and among generations, geographical areas, and sectors.  Deterioration in the labor market is of serious concern for the well-
being of the Japanese population, especially because Japan’s social-safety nets are less extensive than in the United States or 
Europe. 
  The rise in the unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed persons to the number of 
persons in the labor force, is due to a reduction in the number of employed persons greater than the reduction in the size of the 
labor force.  It is largely a demand-side phenomenon ⎯ weak aggregate demand of the sort summarized humorously by Calvin 
Coolidge in 1930: “When more and more people are thrown out of work, unemployment results.”  If an equivalent of the number 
of persons losing jobs withdraw from the labor force, the unemployment rate falls.  However, the majority of dismissed workers 
stay in the labor force, at least for some time, so the rate rises.  Still, Japan's labor force is declining, and this supply-side 
phenomenon in part reflects the rise of “hidden” unemployment ⎯ discouraged persons who have stopped looking for work ⎯ 
and in part reflecting the demographic phenomenon of a decline in the number of persons of labor-force age. 
  In addition to the decline in the quantity of employment, the quality has declined as well during much of the period.  
This is evidenced by the rising number of non-regular workers ⎯ part-timers and others with little job security, as discussed 
later.  The share of regular workers in total workers rose between 1990 and 1997 for both males and females, but after 1997 it 
has fallen continuously.  In 1997, 94.1% of male employees were regular workers, but only 92.1% in 2003.  For females, the 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   2 
 
share fell even more, from 80.9% to 77.6%.  Moreover, the wage differential between regular workers and non-regular workers 
has been increasing since the early 1990s (Higuchi and MOF Research Center 2003; Higuchi, Ohta and HRI 2004). 
It should be kept in mind that Japan is not alone in experiencing a rise of part-time and temporary employment, 
especially among women.  France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain also experienced such a trend in the 1980’s or '90’s 
(see Houseman and Osawa 2003).  Houseman and Osawa also argue that although the recession in the 1990s may have 
accelerated it, the growth of part-time employment began well before the recession.  In other words, the shift away from regular 
full-time employees enjoying nenko (seniority-based) wages and long-term employment is in part structural, so that the rise of 
part-time employment would have occurred even without the malaise of the 1990s. 
  Another quality problem concerns job training.  Japanese firms reduced expenditure on training during the 1990s in 
order to economize on labor costs.  As a result, the share of direct expenditure on training in total labor costs fell from 0.38% in 
1988 to 0.28% in 2002.  Also, the number of establishments that provide formal on-the-job training (OJT) or off-job training 
declined from 86.4% in 1994 to 69.0% in 1999.  (Data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Total Survey on Employment 
Conditions). 
  Weak aggregate demand for labor in the 1990’s is a result of the languishing macro economy.  In our judgment, this 
languishing was not caused by whatever structural problems may exist in the labor market.  Rather, it resulted from weak 
aggregate demand for final products and slow progress in structural reforms in various sectors of the economy.  The lack of 
convincing progress in structural reforms helped perpetuate the pessimistic assessment of the future of the Japanese 
economy, thereby discouraging investment in both physical and human capital.   As a result, the growth of employment 
became less and less responsive to upward swings in the economy throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.  For example, 
the elasticity of the growth rate of the number of employees with respect to GDP growth fell from 0.52 in 1986-91 to 0.37 in 
1993-97, to 0.22 in 1999-2000, and a mere 0.05 in 2002-04. 
  The overall labor force participation rate, defined as the rate for those 15 to 64, declined throughout much of the 
1990s, and the decline accelerated after 1997: the rate went from 63.8 % in 1991 to 63.7% in 1997 to below 61% in 2003.  The 
3 percentage point decrease during 1997-2003 represents 1.2 million people.  In the same period, 2.4 million people lost jobs.  
The net result was an increase of unemployed by 1.2 million.  (These numbers are the authors’ calculations based on the Labor 
Force Survey.) 
  The ratio of employment to population, the employment ratio, also declined during the period. The difference 
between the labor force participation rate and the employment ratio is the unemployment ratio, sometimes used as an 
alternative measure of the extent of labor under-utilization.  The unemployment ratio has been widening since about 1992, from 
1.4% in 1992 to 2.9% in 1999 and then to 3.2% in 2003, mirroring the rise in the unemployment rate. 
  The aggregate trend in the labor force participation rate masks differences among age groups, as Figures 10.2 and 
10.3 show.  A decline in male participation has occurred in most age groups.  For females of post-childbearing prime working 
age (35-44), there were upward trends during much of the period depicted.  A worsening Japanese labor market during the 
1990s likely reinforced a long-term decline in the male participation.  For prime-age females, increasing participation, especially 
in the latter 1990s, may reflect the added-worker effect ⎯ wives picking up part-time employment to supplement losses in the 
husbands’ earnings ⎯ as well as the increased availability of part-time job that enticed women into the labor market. 
  Changes in labor-force participation reflect both business cycle effects and long-term effects.  In Japan, the male 
labor force participation rate has fallen, from 81.7% in 1965 to 77.2% in 1990 and 75.7% in 2001.  The Japanese female rate 
also has fallen, although not by much, from 50.6% in 1965 to 50.1% in 1990 and 49.2% in 2001.  For comparison, the United 
States has experienced declining labor-force participation among males for a century and rising participation among females 
throughout much of the post-World War II period.  Focusing on years after 1970, US labor-force participation for all males 16 or 
older declined from 80.6% in 1970 to 74.1% in 2002.  The rate for women rose from 43.3% in 1970 to 59.6% in 2002.  These 
trends reflect long-term forces that are generated, among other factors, by rising real income and rising female wages. 
\footnote 1 
{note 1 
1  Japanese rates are based on the Annual Report on the Labor Force Survey (Ministry of Public Management, Home 
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications), as summarized in Japanese Working Life Profile 2003 (Japan Institute of Labor), 
Table 13.  For US rates, see [US] Handbook of Labor Statistics, 17th Edition (2004), Table 1-7. 
  As to causes, rising real income increased the demand for leisure for males, thereby raising the reservation wage.  
Females have responded to rising wages by substituting paid work for household work and leisure.  For detailed discussions, 
see Pencavel (1986) for male labor supply and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for female labor supply. 
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  Japan has seen an increase in non-regular workers (part-time workers, those on arbeit status, etc) from 18.8% of 
employment in 1990 to 25.5% in 2002.  Particularly noteworthy is that large employers (those with 1000 or more employees) 
have been relying more on part-timers:  between 1995 and 2001, the proportion grew from 3.9% to 8.6%.  At 120%, this was 
the largest increase of any firm-size group.  Non-regular workers typically are paid less than regular workers, so this change in 
worker composition must have depressed disposal income and hence aggregate demand by consumers. 
  Japan is not unique in experiencing rising part-time work.  In many OECD countries, it has accounted for a large 
share of overall employment growth between 1991 and 2001.  According to a 2003 OECD report, rising part-time employment 
was large enough to more than offset declining full-time employment in Austria (0.2% for part-time vs -0.1% for full-time), 
Finland (0.3% vs -0.2%), Italy (0.4% vs -0.2%), and Japan (0.5% vs -0.4%).  The report also mentions that part-time work has 
been a particularly important factor behind employment growth for women, youths and, to a lesser extent, older workers.  
(OECD 2003, Table 1.4.) 
  For most years since the late 1990s, annual growth in the real wage rate for all non-agricultural industries has 
remained negative: -2% in 1998, -0.9% in 1999, -0.4% in 2001 and -1.3% in 2002.  (Data are for establishment with 5+ workers 
as reported in the 2004 Katsuyo Rodo Tokei, Table C-1(2).)  The real wage in Japan’s business sector grew by only 0.3% in 
both the 1990-95, and 1995-02 periods, in sharp contrast to the growth of 3.3% during 1970-80 and 1.3% during 1980-90 
(OECD 2003).  By comparison, the growth rate for the US business-sector wage jumped to 1.6% in 1995-02 from 0.7% in 
1990-95 (OECD 2003, Table 1.A1.1). 
  Wage growth in Japanese manufacturing started to slow after 1990, and became negative after the mid-1990s.  
Hourly compensation grew by 105.7% between 1985 and 1990 and by 84.5% between 1990 and 1995, but was -8.7% between 
1995 and 2000, and -14.7% in the three years 2000-02.  (US Economic Report of the President 2004, Table B-109).  
 
2  Near-Term Problems and Solutions 
 
Four problems closely related to the poor performance of the economy, which means a restoration of growth will mitigate, but 
not "solve", them, are addressed in this section.  These are job training and worker satisfaction, youth idleness, gender gaps in 
unemployment, and geographical differences in employment measures. 
 
2.1  Job Training and Worker Satisfaction 
 
In order to raise productivity and increase long-term competitiveness, Japanese firms need to pay increased attention to job 
training and job satisfaction.  In the 1990s, many firms cut labor costs in the name of restructuring.  This made some firms 
more competitive, but it also resulted in a loss of skills and worker morale as employees were laid-off or transferred. Thus, 
Chuma et al (2004) report worker discontent in the electrical, electronic, and information industries increased in the 1990s due 
in part to weakening participatory employment practices. 
  As Japanese firms regain economic prowess, they will need to invest more in human capital to ensure their 
competitiveness is maintained.  Worker satisfaction will rise if workers feel that employers are willing to invest in them through 
training. 
  As to public policy on training, Japan might consider the applicability of a program similar to the “Jobs for the 21st 
Century” initiative that US President George W Bush proposed in his 2004 State of the Union message.  Included in this 
initiative is a proposal to strengthen ties between employers and community colleges with a view to retraining unemployed 
workers.  Community colleges in the US are reported to enroll over 10 million students each year, many of them laid-off 
workers.  A statement in the White House press release (January 2004) is relevant for Japan as well: 
 
"Helping Americans Access High-Demand Jobs: America's economy is growing, but it is also changing due to higher 
productivity and new technology. It is more important than ever that Americans have the education and training needed to 
succeed. The No Child Left Behind Act is bringing important reforms to America's schools by insisting on standards and 
accountability for results. There are substantial resources available to implement these reforms.... 
  "Many older students and current workers will also need to strengthen their skills to compete for the jobs of tomorrow. 
President Bush proposed more than $500 million for a series of measures called Jobs for the 21st Century - designed to 
provide extra help to middle and high school students who fall behind in reading and math, expand Advanced Placement 
programs in low-income schools, and invite math and science professionals from the private sector to teach part-time in high 
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  "The President's Jobs for the 21st Century initiative also increases support for America's community colleges to train 
workers for the industries that are creating the most new jobs. The initiative will also provide larger Pell Grants for low-income 
students who prepare for college with demanding courses in high school." 
 
  Japan could leverage senmon gakko or similar vocational training schools to deal with training.  The aim is to 
facilitate training of workers for skills that will be in high demand and skills that match new and emerging jobs and technology.  
It is worth noting that the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has proposed a system for deducting job-
training cost from the corporate tax. 
 
2.2  The Idle Young 
 
One of the most pressing concerns is the rate of idleness (being neither in the labor force nor in school) among teenagers (15-
19) and youths (20-24). The last two columns of Table 10.1 show that the increase in idleness has been particularly 
pronounced for those 15 to 19 throughout Japan, in part reflecting significant increases in the group's unemployment rate since 
the early 1990s.  In addition, there is the issue of under-employment of young people, as evidenced by the phenomenon of 
“freeters”.  It should be kept in mind that Japan is not alone in this:  throughout the OECD, young people experienced more 
serious employment problems in the job market in the 1990s than in earlier years. 
  Idle youth are missing the opportunity to receive formal education and acquire knowledge and experience about the 
world of work.  Idleness thus has serious long-term implications through a reduction of human capital formation, with long-term 
consequences for labor productivity, and an increase in anti-social behaviors ⎯ there are worrisome signs that youth 
unemployment is linked to youth crime.  Particularly alarming, more young persons are being arrested for such serious crimes 
as violence and larceny. 
        The arrest-rate for those 14-19 rose 25% from the mid-1990s to 2002, although it remains below the level of the 
early 1980s.  Specifically, the rate fell from over 18 per thousand during 1982-84 to around 12 during 1993-96, rose to 17 in 
1999 and in 2002 was around 16.  For those 20-24, the rate has fluctuated around 4 per thousand since 1990, having declined 
in the last half of the 1980s from levels between 5 and 6 earlier in the decade.  (More detailed tabulations available on request.) 
  Even for youths who are remaining in the labor force, either employed or unemployed, the phenomenon of freeters 
has attracted a great deal of attention.  A freeter is defined as a person 15 to 34, not a student or housewife, who works in part-
time jobs or who is unemployed but looking to work only part-time even if a full-time job is available.  Freeter status can be 
either voluntary or involuntary.  Government data estimate there were 4.17 million freeters in 2001, 10% of them 15-19, 34% 
20-24, 36% 25-29, and 19% 30-34.  This compares to 1.86 million in 1989.  The average age of freeters increased during this 
time:  initially the largest group were in their early 20s.  
  The original distinguishing characteristic of freeters was that they did not aspire to get on the traditional full-time 
career track, at least in the early years of their working careers.  It is not clear if such an attitude is just a passing phase or a 
life-long phenomenon.  At any rate, the fact that such a term as freeters was coined in Japan reveals how different the work 
attitude of younger generations is perceived to have become compared to previous generations.  (The word itself is a 
contraction of "free arbeiter" - a free worker in the spirit of free agents in sports.)   
It is important to keep in mind that being a freeter was at first a voluntary, supply-side phenomenon, a counter-
culture, as it were, and not a demand-deficiency phenomenon.  During the economic boom in the 1980s, an increasing number 
of youths began choosing to work part-time as a career objective.  As recession persisted through the 1990s, however, the 
phenomenon became more and more the result of demand deficiency, as an increasing number of youths had no choice but to 
work part-time.  Thus, in fiscal 2003, over 86% of young males and almost 50% of young females were looking for permanent 
jobs and of these, over 95% wished to become permanent employees before reaching 30 (Cabinet Office 2003; see Chiba 
2004 for related discussions.)  Moreover, the stagnant economy does little to accommodate adults who had chosen the life of a 
freeter when the economy was flush, but now want full-time jobs.  (See Danke 2003 for real-life experiences of some freeters.  
Note that his calculation in the text of the age distribution is incorrect, and inconsistent with his graph.) 
  Voluntary or involuntary, because part-time employment typically offers fewer opportunities for on-the-job training 
than full-time employment, freeters miss-out on investing in employment-based human capital, adversely affecting their 
productivity for life. 
  Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) found that aggregate unemployment is the single most important explanatory 
variable in explaining youth labor-market problems in OECD countries.  This points to improving the macro economy as the 
solution.  However, in our view, this is only part of the solution. 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   5 
 
  Recall an elementary theory of labor supply:  an individual compares a reservation wage to the market wage in 
deciding whether or not to enter the labor market.  That is, when the real wage available in the market falls below the 
reservation wage, a potential worker will not enter the labor market.  Here, the reservation wage and the real wage are broadly 
conceived to include “the whole of the advantages and disadvantages” of market work, to use Adam Smith’s terminology, as 
well as money wage.  Thus, improvements in the macro economy that raise the market real wage will be a solution to the 
problem of non-participation in the labor market. 
  However, the reservation wage of Japanese youths may have become too high; if so, what is required is a reshaping 
of the appreciation for life- long work.  Teachers and parents can help shape children’s reservation wage by adopting a “back-
to-the basics” approach and instilling an appreciation of educational and work experience as the way to ensure having many 
options, economic and otherwise, in their adult lives. 
  As for youth crime, it is well known that a lack of legal employment opportunities results in criminal conduct.  Here, 
too, an improved macro economy will help, especially with such economic crimes as pick-pocketing and robbery.  Youths who 
commit crimes should face penalties, of course.  Levitt (1998) finds evidence for the United States that punishing juvenile 
offenders is an effective means of combating crimes.  However, public policies must weigh the benefits and costs of 
punishment.  According to Levitt’s evidence, the severity of juvenile sanctions has little effect on later criminal behavior.  
Freeman (2003) analyzes criminal activities among disadvantaged US youths and concludes that a high cost of crime and 
incarceration suggests potentially large returns to prevention programs, be it employment subsidies, training programs, 
increased expenditure on police, etc. 
  An important cost of incarcerating offending youths is the stigma effect, which may be long-lasting, especially in 
Japan.  An alternative to incarceration, especially for light offenders, is to require that they go through counseling and training 
sessions.  The criminal record is then expunged sometime after successful completion of the sessions, which mitigates stigma 
effects.  Such a system is used in many parts of the United States for teenagers apprehended for under-age drinking. 
 
2.3  Gender Gaps in Unemployment 
 
Reversing the traditional pattern, the male unemployment rate has remained higher than the female rate since 1997 (Figure 
10.1).  This reflects such fundamental changes as the shift of economic activities from manufacturing and construction to 
service and trade.  It also reflects employers’ increasing reliance on part-time and temporary workers, who are more likely to be 
female, underscoring the lack of confidence in the economy’s prospect that makes employers reluctant to invest in long-term 
employees. 
  The loss of manufacturing jobs has been absolutely and proportionately greater for women than for men.  This 
contributed slightly more to the rise in the female unemployment rate than to the male rate.  Specifically, manufacturing 
employment fell by 1.28 million (26%) for females and 1.24 million (14%) for males between 1997 and 2003.  It should be noted 
that manufacturing jobs are disappearing all over the world, even in China (See Carson 2003). 
  Figure 10.4 shows that the number of regular workers has declined since 1998 and the number of temporary workers 
has been increasing since 1995.  At the same time, more and more women have been getting temporary and lower-wage jobs. 
 On the demand side, this phenomenon is due to employer reluctance to invest in human capital in the form of male workers 
with long-term employment given the environment of grave uncertainty about the future of the economy.  On the supply side, it 
may be partly due to the additional-worker phenomenon in which wives whose husbands lost employment or experienced wage 
cuts enter the labor market to supplement family income to help maintain consumption. 
  Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 document the trends in part-time and full-time employment after 1980.  Table 10.2 shows 
that the proportion of workers who are part-time is typically higher for women than for men and that there was an overall 
increase in this proportion for both men and women.  The part-time proportion rose throughout these years, but the increases 
for those 15 to 24 and 65+ were especially pronounced.  Of particular note is that over 46% of working women 40 years or 
older held part-time jobs in 2003, as compared to 29% to 35% during 1985-90. 
  Table 10.3 shows the gender distribution of part-time employment.  Clearly, women have the larger share.  Note, 
however, that since the mid-1980s the female share has shown a declining overall trend in all age categories except 15-24. 
  Table 10.4 shows the gender distribution of total full-time employment.  Men have a far larger share of full-time jobs 
in all age groups except 15-24, where they have been just over half.  Men have increased share slightly in some groups and 
decreased in others, but there is no discernible overall trend. 
  Another way of looking at part-time employment is the number of hours worked.  There was a notable increase in the 
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47.7% (from 1.07 million to 1.58 million), those working 15-29 hours increased by 34.8% (from 3.39 million to 4.57 million), and 
those working between 30-34 hours increased by 18.3% (from 1.86 million to 2.20 million).  (Authors’ calculations from Annual 
Report on the Labor Force Survey 2003.) 
  Female part-time workers generally receive low pay.  They earned less than 44% of male worker earnings, whereas 
male part-timers earned almost 51%.  The gender differences in part reflect the industries and specific jobs men and women 
are likely to work in, as well as the "glass ceiling" career women still face in Japan.  (Data from Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho 
2003, Figure 1-2-5.) 
  Clearly, Japan has seen a reduction in the employment of regular workers and increase in temporary workers.  In 
other words, more and more workers have been shifted from high-wage regular employment to lower-wage part-time and 
temporary jobs.  Some of this should disappear once the economy starts growing and employers become persuaded that the 
recovery is sustainable, so that they again commit to long-term employment.  Also, some workers initially hired as part-timers 
become regular workers after proving themselves.  Such a practice, referred to as a “trial” employment, should increase as the 
economic recovery gains momentum. 
 
2.4 Regional  Variations 
 
Unemployment has been rising in rural prefectures, exacerbating regional inequality in economic well-being.  Between 1998 
and 2003 the unemployment rate increased in all prefectures, and especially in rural and other non-metropolitan areas.  The 
mean increase was 1.3 percentage points, with a range of about 0.1 point for Tokyo and Okinawa to over 2.5 points in 
Tokushima (on Shikoku).  (In Japan, there is no special criterion to distinguish between rural and urban areas.  Normally, urban 
areas are defined as the three major urban areas, Shutoken (the Tokyo-Yokohama area, also called Minami Kanto) Tokai 
(Nagoya), and Kansai (Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe), following the Japan Census Bureau.) 
  The mean change in employment levels was -4.5%, with a range from nearly +4% in Okinawa to almost -12% in 
Wakayama.  Besides Okinawa, only Tokyo and two adjoining prefectures (Kanagawa and Chiba) gained jobs, but being near 
Tokyo was not sufficient to limit losses ⎯ Saitama lost over 2% of its jobs. 
  The regional differences are a consequence of two major changes.  First, there has been a sectoral shift of economic 
activities from manufacturing to service and trade.  Table 10.5 indicates that agriculture, fisheries, and forestry continued to 
lose employment throughout the years after 1980.  All other sectors were gaining employment in the 1980s, but manufacturing 
and finance started to lose employment after 1990.  Between 1998 and 2002, jobs were lost in all sectors except services.  
Manufacturing employment peaked in 1992, and fell below that in services in 1995.  Construction peaked in 1997, but in 2003 
was still above the level in 1990. 
  As manufacturing started to lose employment, factories in regional areas were especially likely to lose jobs.  In the 
1960s and '70s Japan had several national plans to encourage firms to relocate or build new manufacturing capacity outside 
the main urban areas in order to reduce congestion and address regional imbalances  (See, for example Tanaka 1972).  Such 
plants are especially vulnerable to closure during contractions. 
  Second, there was a reduction of government expenditures on public works.  This resulted in the loss of employment 
in the latter 1990s and early 2000s, especially in construction.  As is well known, such expenditures were used to favor LDP 
strong holds ⎯ agricultural and rural prefectures. 
  Globalization of economic activities also is an important reason for spatial changes in employment.  Once a steady 
source of employment for many rural areas, manufacturers increasingly are moving production overseas in a process known as 
hollowing out, or exiting the market altogether.  In contrast, some urban areas have benefited from foreign firms locating in 
these areas, especially in finance and IT software.  This is especially true of the Tokyo area:  36% of jobs created by foreign 
investment have been in Tokyo and 13% in neighboring Kanagawa prefecture (Yokohama, Kawasaki).  The relative importance 
of foreign investment in job creation is 2.4% in Tokyo, 2.6% in Kanagawa, 2.7% in Hiroshima prefecture.  (Estimates for 1996 
by Fukao and Amano 2004). 
  The transformation of rural economies is a reality that has existed for decades.  Displaced workers in rural areas 
must be willing to retrain for new jobs or relocate.  Policy options include (1) transferring budget authority for employment 
creation and training policies from the central authority to local government, because how to spend money efficiently is best 
determined at the local level where the relevant information resides, and (2) facilitating worker migrations, especially for young 
persons, to areas where new types of jobs are being created. 
  Migration of young workers from rural to urban areas has in fact been a persistent phenomenon in Japan’s postwar 
development.  It is worrisome, therefore, that the rate of geographical mobility has fallen recently.  To what extent this is due to 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   7 
 
parents wanting to keep their children nearby in these days of low birth rates is an interesting issue to explore.  There also has 
been a new interest in agriculture ⎯ not traditional rice farming, but more high-value crops including specialty rice varieties, 
although this involves only a small number of people.  
 
 
3  Structural Issues and Solutions 
 
This section takes up the dual economy, sectoral changes, and re-allocation of human resources; dependency for employment 
on government sectors; the industrial relations system; and working hours. 
 
3.1  Dual Economy, Sectoral Changes, and Re-allocation of Human Resources 
 
Only 5 of 28 industries, employing a little over 18% of regular workers, had total factor productivity (TFP) exceeding that of the 
United States in 1995 (Table 10.6).  Export-driven manufacturers such as transportation machinery and electrical machinery 
boast high productivity.  The high productivity of finance and real estate seems odd given the prevalent concerns about the 
health of the Japanese financial sectors.  This may be driven by the real estate sector and the fact that firms in finance could 
raise value-added because they were protected by regulation.  What is needed is to raise the productivity for the non-export 
oriented sectors through rationalization and reorganization. 
  Japan has been experiencing a shift of economic activities from manufacturing and construction to services (Table 
10.5).  This is especially so for medical and welfare services, which together employed nearly 500,000 in 2003, almost the 
same level as construction.  Such shifts reflect the well-known phenomenon of an economy moving from the traditional primary 
to secondary sector, and then to the tertiary sector.  In other words, a vibrant economy is constantly renewing itself, a process 
well-captured by Joseph Schumpeter's phrase "creative destruction". 
  As real income rises, consumer demand for goods and services changes because of differences in income 
elasticities.  The decline of manufacturing and a rise of services are part of this process, although the decline of construction is 
due more to the reduction of public works investments in the mid-1990s.  Displaced workers from disappearing industries must 
retrain and move to new industries.  
  Public policies must not impede, indeed they must encourage, retraining and the shifting of workers to high-
productivity sectors.  Retraining and providing means that enhance mobility are investments in human capital.  To the extent 
that the capital market is imperfect and cannot help meet liquidity needs associated with retraining and mobility, it is sound for 
the government to subsidize retraining and mobility expenses.  Some workers in traditional, low-productivity sectors continue to 
enjoy job security from such non-economic barriers as political and legal constraints, cultural biases against career changes 
and mobility, and lack of information, all of which reduce the incentive to move out of low-productivity sectors.  Such barriers 
must be eliminated. 
 
3.2  Dependency on Government Job Creation 
 
Government expenditures as a source of employment creation are significant, especially in non-metropolitan areas, and they 
increased between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s (Table 10.7).  Japan has spent enormous sums on public works in rural 
areas.  To be sure, some of the spending was needed to tie Japan’s countryside together but, arguably, too much money went 
to such projects as highways, airports, railroads, ports, and other such infrastructure.  It is inevitable, and even desirable, that 
public money continue to be spent to benefit Japanese living in rural as well as urban areas. 
  Japan for decades has consistently devoted a larger share of GDE to public investment than the United States, UK, 
France, and Germany.  In contrast, throughout the 1990s, Japan’s share of expenditures on employment policies was lower, 
except in comparison to the US.  There was a slight tendency for the share to increase, but the change is affected by the 
general unemployment rate, as seen in Table 10.8. 
  Evidence suggests that public investment in Japan no longer raises overall productivity as it once did.  Higuchi et al 
(2002) reached this conclusion from an extensive analysis of data at the prefectural level for 1975-98.  Over this period, only 5 
of 47 prefectures showed positive changes in the effects of social capital on total factor productivity; 8 showed declines of over 
50%.  Here, social capital is defined as roads and highways, airports and seaports, transportation and communication 
equipment, water supply, agricultural equipment, public school and hospital buildings, city halls and related assets.  It is past 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   8 
 
time for policy makers to seriously assess whether such public expenditures should shift more toward strengthening safety-net 
provisions and stimulating employment ways other than public works projects.  
 
3.3  Industrial Relations System 
 
Japanese industrial relations have been undergoing rapid changes since the mid-1990s.  Employers used to emphasize 
ensuring the livelihood of their employees by offering strong job security and paying employees based on seniority.  In turn, 
employees were expected to put up with such inconveniences as long working hours and frequent relocations.  However, 
Japanese employers have begun to rely more on merit as the basis for wages and job security.  This has meant that employers 
have come to rely more and more on employees’ being self-reliant and taking responsibility for ensuring their livelihood.  
Perhaps reflecting these changes, the annual spring labor negotiations known as shunto have shifted from demanding general 
wage increases to demanding job security and revising the wage table.  
  
Two important challenges face Japanese industrial relations.  These relate to job training and to worker-employer 
mismatch. 
  
As regards job training, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, 1992) demonstrated in their comparative studies of Japanese 
and US labor markets that Japan’s “unique” employment system ⎯ Cole’s (1971) nenko promotion, nenko wages, and 
“lifetime” employment − was prevalent in Japan throughout the high-growth years, although more so among larger firms.  
Smaller firms tried to emulate it.  These practices are likely to continue to become less common, even at large firms, as Japan 
comes to rely more on merit based decision-making for wages and employment.  This raises an important issue on the nature 
of job training. 
 Under  the  nenko system, senior workers could train young workers without fear of weakening their own standing.  
But, if wages and promotion are based on merit rather than seniority, this willingness is undermined.  This means more training 
will have to take place in formal settings, be it formal training provided by the employer or at third-party training schools.  Since 
formal training tends to be more general than firm-specific, bonding between employers and employees is weakened.  Already, 
there is evidence that such participatory practices as small-group activities have been weakening, and worker unhappiness has 
become prevalent as a result (Chuma, Kato, and Ohashi 2004).  In turn, labor turnover can be expected to increase.  Such an 
increase is not necessarily bad.  The likely shift of training from informal to formal settings makes “jobs for the 21st century” 
type policies relevant options for Japan to consider. 
  As regards worker-employer mismatches, Japan needs to foster an environment in which these can be corrected in 
an efficient manner, and to promote efficient labor turnover.  Japan, in effect, had strict employment protection practices, both 
formal and informal in the 1960s through the 1980s.  Having compared turnover rates in Japan and the United States, we 
assert that employer-employee attachment in Japan was too strong during the prosperous years of the 1970s and '80s (see, for 
example, Hashimoto 1990, ch 3).  The so-called “life-time employment” practice resulted in too little turnover relative to what 
was efficient, especially at large companies. 
  Employment protection caused little problem when the economy was growing at a rapid rate.  With the economy 
stagnating and jobs being lost, however, the practice hinders timely changes in the deployment of workers.  Ironically, 
employment protection slows employment recovery.  Until employers gain confidence that favorable conditions in the economy 
will last for a long time, they will be reluctant to hire new workers, or recall laid-off workers, because they know it is difficult to 
discharge employees in downturns. 
  Institutional rigidities, norms, and rules inhibit efficient separations.  Historically in postwar Japan, a worker who 
voluntarily separated tended to be stigmatized as foot-loose, and an employer who dismissed workers, even for sound 
business reasons, acquired a reputation for shameful conduct and thus had trouble hiring new workers.  Japanese employers 
still face all sorts of hurdles before being allowed to dismiss workers.  The laws and regulations that inhibit efficient separations 
need to be weakened, if not eliminated, and biases against workers changing jobs or employers dismissing workers need to be 
reduced through education. 
  At the same time, inefficient separations ⎯ separations that occur even though the parties taken together are better 
off not separating ⎯ must be minimized.  In this vein, we posit that there have been excessive inefficient separations in the 
United States (see, for example, Hashimoto 1990).  Inefficient separations occur when there is information asymmetry between 
the employers and employees regarding their valuations of alternatives (Hashimoto 1995).  For example, even when a 
separation is inefficient, an employee may make a unilateral decision, incorrectly, to quit for lack of communication with the 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   9 
 
employer, who does not get a chance to persuade staying.  Similarly, an employer may dismiss a worker inefficiently because 
the employee refuses, incorrectly, to accept a pay cut to save the job because of distrust of the information provided by the 
employer.  So, the first step in promoting efficient turnover is to reduce information asymmetry so that the parties do not 
separate by mistake.  To this end, we encourage preservation of enterprise-based unions and joint consultations, both of which 
otherwise may become diluted as employment attachment weakens. 
 
3.4 Working  Hours 
 
In 1988, there was a revision of the Labor Standards Law stipulating a reduction in the statutory work-week.  As a result, in 
1988 the work-week was reduced from 48 hours to 44 hours, and fell to 40 hours in 1993.  In addition, during 1988-93, three 
national holidays were added, bring the total to fifteen as compared to nine in the United States. 
  Government offices were closed on Saturdays every other week beginning in 1989, and since 1992 have been 
closed every Saturday.  Financial institutions have been closed on Saturdays since 1989.  A temporary law was introduced in 
1992 to bring about a further reduction in hours worked.  In addition, the 1998 revision of the Labor Standards Law added one 
more day to paid vacation allowance (Summary from Hayashi and Prescott 2002).  It is interesting to note that some German 
employers and unions are moving towards increasing standard work hours to stay competitive,  but the typical German works 
far fewer hours and days than a typical Japanese ⎯ indeed, under the standard definition of part-time work (less than 35 hours 
per week), a large part of Germany's "full-time" labor force is actually "part-time"!. 
  The extent of compliance with the regulations is an open question.  Many employees appear to continue to work long 
hours:  the proportion of employees working 60 hours per week or longer is increasing in spite of employee complaints about 
excessive hours.  Based on informal discussions with owners and managers of mid-size companies, long working hours are 
common among younger regular workers.  One reason is this.  Normally, workers in a cohort hired fresh out of school, as has 
been the norm, each receive the same compensation as one another for several years.  However, they compete for 
promotions.  One way to compete is to put in long hours to impress their bosses.  This suggests that at least part of the hours 
these workers are spending is unproductive rent seeking behavior. \footnote 2 
{footnote 
2  The Hayashi and Prescott (2002) model suggests that the mandated reduction in work hours in the early 1990s 
contributed to Japan's slow growth rate during the 1990s, although just how important this was cannot be ascertained from their 
model.  In evaluating how the hours reduction affected economic growth, it is critical to ascertain the extent of compliance.  It 
seems far from being complete.  Moreover, it is possible that the marginal product of hours had been close to zero or even 
negative prior to the change in the law − workers simply hung around until late hours because that was the thing to do.  A 
manager of a mid-size company told us that some workers do sloppy work during the day, knowing they can polish it up later in 
the evening.  If marginal product was negative, then the regulation actually should have increased productivity.  These and 
other interesting issues are left for future study. 
{end 
  Current long working hours could reflect an upturn in the economy, with employers choosing to meet increased 
demand by increasing work hours rather than hiring new workers.  This is a sensible approach on the part of employers, given 
the uncertainty the economy faces as to how long-lasting the recovery will be.  Still, it is desirable for employers to become 
proactive in reducing both excessive and unproductive long working hours. 
 
 
4  The Shrinking and Aging Population 
 
Japan’s population is expected to drop from 127 million in 2000 to 109 million in 2040, a decline of almost 14% (Katsuyo Rodo 
Tokei 2004, Table K-2).  Moreover, it is projected to become the world’s oldest by 2025.  By 2040 the prime working-age 
population (15-64) will drop by over 29%, from 86 million to 61 million, and the older population (65 or older) will rise by almost 
64%, from 22 million to 36 million, compared to 2000.  As a result, the ratio of elderly to persons of prime working age will rise 
from 0.25 to 0.59.  The prospect of such an age composition raises serious and urgent issues for Japan’s long-term prospects, 
economic and otherwise. 
 
4.1 Immigration  Policy 
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Given the seriousness of the population issue, it is worth exploring the extent to which Japan would be willing to sacrifice ethnic 
homogeneity in the prime-age population by allowing increased immigration of foreign workers.  We are not talking here about 
contract workers on temporary visa but about permanent workers, many of whom would bring families and even become 
Japanese citizens.  The scale of immigration necessary to meet labor shortage has been estimated as 17 million new 
immigrants by 2050, which would be 18% of the 2050 population, compared to the current 1%.  Other estimates indicate that 
Japan needs to admit 400,000 new immigrants each year to ensure a steady flow of needed workforce (French 2003 Jul 24).  
  If Japan chooses to remain ethnically homogeneous, it most certainly will become a smaller country with an 
increasingly older population, unless the current low fertility rate makes a dramatic turn upward.  An increase in fertility 
sufficient to offset the effects of the rapidly aging population seems unlikely, however.  This means people will have to retire 
later in life, and fund more of their own pensions in the face of the shrinking number of prime-age workers.  Longer working 
lives means older workers must be retrained to stay productively employed.  (Broda and Weinstein, in their chapter, expect 
fertility to rise to replacement level at some point and thus stabilize the population, but that does not affect the point here.)  An 
optimistic scenario is that, as long as labor productivity keeps rising through technological progress and capital investment, 
Japanese for the most part will continue to enjoy affluent lives.  The key is for technological progress and capital investment to 
keep occurring. 
  On the other hand, Japan could take a bold step and begin accepting a small but steady increase in the number of 
carefully selected prime-age immigrants, who would then be integrated into mainstream Japanese society.  In this scenario, 
Japan gradually becomes a melting pot ⎯ or at least a salad bowl  ⎯ much like the United States, with increased ethnic 
diversity and a more-balanced age composition.  Prime-age foreign workers will help alleviate the difficulties of financing 
pensions in the face of the growing number of retirees. 
  The choice between these alternatives is not simply a matter of economics.  In fact, economic considerations may be 
secondary.  Concerns about loss of the uniquely Japanese culture and social customs are legitimate and must be carefully 
weighed against the benefits of immigration.  Implications of increased ethnic diversity on the cost of enforcing laws and social 
norms must be clearly understood.  We believe it is worth undertaking a serious reassessment of the fundamental value 
system of the society and developing a consensus on what kind of country Japan should look like in 40 to 50 years.  Avoiding 
these choices means simply muddling along hoping increased labor productivity will alleviate economic problems and just 
allowing a small number of foreign immigrants to enter the country on temporary bases, most of whom will not be granted 
Japanese citizenship. 
  It is interesting that in 2004 Germany passed a path-breaking law introducing a system of allowing qualified skilled 
foreign workers to settle permanently, beginning in January 2005.  A potential immigrant must possess skills in certain fields 
such as engineering, information technology, or sciences.  The law also establishes services to help immigrants assimilate into 
German society.  It was drafted with an eye toward the country’s aging population, as well as skill shortages, and was based on 
German’s realization that it needs resident foreigners to prosper.  (There already are over 7 million non-citizens in Germany, 
about 8.5% of the resident population; this includes about 1.6 million born in Germany.)  
  Japan has been addressing the immigration issue, including temporary foreign labor, for some time.  Immigration 
policy was reformed in 1982 by specifying procedure for accepting refugees and defining 6 categories of specialists who could 
work in Japan.  However, the definitions were vague, and decisions appear to have been arbitrary.  In 1990 Japan took steps to 
facilitate immigration of foreign professionals.  Now there are 12 specialized categories.  A potential employer can obtain a 
certificate of eligibility for a foreign worker.  With that, the Japanese Consulate issues a visa to the worker, who can then come 
to Japan.  The visa can be valid for three years, one year, or six month, and is renewable an unlimited number of times.  This 
means the worker's status is always temporary, but indefinitely so. 
  The effect of this change has been explored by Fuess (2003).  His data show only a modest acceleration in the 
annual growth rate of entry of highly skilled foreign workers ⎯ from 9.5% during 1982-89 to almost 10% between 1990 and 
2000 ⎯ in part because the Japanese economy was in a deep recession throughout much of the 1990s.  Still, the overall 
number of foreign workers grew noticeably between 1990 and 2002.  In 1990, there were 260,000 legal foreign workers in 
Japan, which was 0.5% of all employed persons.  By 2002, the number had grown almost three-fold to 760,000, which was 
1.4% of all employed persons. 
  It is worth mentioning that, at this writing, Japan is considering a specific program for allowing rotational immigration 
from the Philippines in such occupations as nurses and care workers for the elderly.  Under this program, a Filipino would be 
allowed to work in Japan for five years and then return home, the position being filled for the subsequent five years by another 
Filipino.  Clearly, this is best characterized as a foreign guest-worker program rather than an immigration program. 04 09 29  Solutions  ch 10   11 
 
  The aforementioned developments are promising steps toward alleviating near- and intermediate-term labor 
shortages in certain occupational categories.  To address the long-term issue of the declining prime-age population, however, 
Japan needs to confront the more fundamental issue of the trade-off between staying ethnically homogeneous and becoming 
smaller in size or allowing increased immigration of prime-age foreign labor to counteract the aging of its population. 
 
4.2 Mandatory  Retirement 
 
The aging of the Japanese population calls for a re-examination of the retirement system, which currently allows age-based 
mandatory retirement.  Lazear’s theory of mandatory retirement (1979) implies that, for Japan, the system made sense when 
long-term (“lifetime employment”) employment was the norm.  However, if there is a diminution of long-term employment in 
Japan, the practice loses Lazear’s theoretical justification.  There is the issue of age discrimination as well. 
  One outcome is for retirement to become voluntary.  To induce voluntary retirement, earnings profiles will have to be 
configured to induce retirement in an optimal way.  The age at which a person becomes eligible to receive social security will 
play a role.  Another outcome is for mandatory retirement to be retained but with productive older workers receiving post-
retirement contracts so they can continue contributing to the economy.  Because the health of the elderly likely will continue 
improving, many elderly may wish to work simply to have something to do.  On a practical side, given that population aging will 
make funding the social security system more and more challenging, the eligible age for social security and the threshold 
retirement age need to be become more and more flexible, and definitely later in years. 
 
 
5  Women in the Work Force 
 
Women arguably have been the most under-utilized human resource in Japan.  The 2003 World Economic Forum ranked 
Japan 69th of 75 member nations in empowering its women (French 2003 Jul 25).  In a 2002 survey conducted by Naikaku-fu, 
a government agency, 60% of respondents said they think women are discriminated against in wages, 31% think women's 
talents are not accurately evaluated and appreciated, and almost 31% think that discrimination exists in promotion.  Clearly, 
having this significant source of talent fully deployed will help sustain a thriving economy. 
  To be sure, Japan did make some progress after 1980 in reducing gender differential in wages.  According to Blau 
and Kahn (2000), Japan along with many other countries, succeeded in reducing pay inequity between the early 1980s and the 
late 1990s.  Using median weekly earnings of full-time workers as the measure, female wages increased from 58.7% of male 
wages in 1979-81 to 59.0% in 1980-90 and 63.6% in 1994-98.  This is not particularly impressive, however.  In fact, in 1994-98 
the Japanese wage ratio was still the lowest among the 13 countries studied.  The next lowest was Canada at 69.8%; France 
had the highest level, 89.9%.  The US level rose from 62.5% to 76.3% during 1980-98.  Much of this difference reflects 
differences in the job categories and industries in which men and women work, as well as experience (seniority).  But it is a fact 
that, as a practical matter, many of the better-paying jobs simply are not available to women. 
  Whether women have suffered disproportionately during the economic malaise that began in the early 1990s is 
unclear.  In part this is because the data mask the tendency for women to be in the low-wage, part-time, temporary, and other 
non-regular parts of the work force.  What is worrisome is that the wage gap between women working full-time and those 
working part-time has been increasing.  As of 2000, such women earned less than 44% of full-time men; in contrast, male part-
timers earned almost 51% of male full-timers. 
  Japanese women are increasingly moving into higher positions.  According to data compiled by the Labor and 
Welfare Ministry (based on the Basic Wage Survey), the proportion of private-sector managerial positions held by women has 
risen from 5% in 1990 to over 8% in 2001.  However, there is much room left for improvement, as evidenced by the fact that 
while 40% of Japanese women work, they hold only 9% of managerial positions, as compared with about 45% for the United 
States (International Labor Organization data quoted by French 2003 Jul 25). 
 
5.1  Policies to Promote the Role of Women 
 
What policies are needed to encourage women to be in the work force and to make greater use of their skills?  We offer three 
suggestions.  The first two are general policies:  continued strengthening of equal-employment laws and pursuing a proactive 
approach to ensure that women can continue to stay in the labor force as much as possible.  The third is a specific proposal for 
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  The Japanese Constitution guarantees gender equality as a matter of law.  Under the existing Labor Standard Law, 
employers are required to pay the same wage to workers with the same job responsibilities, regardless of sex.  An Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law (EEO) was implemented in 1986 and later strengthened by amendments that became effective in 
1999. 
  The EEO is intended to promote equal opportunities for women and men, fair treatment in employment settings, and 
measures for ensuring the health of female employees during pregnancy and after childbirth.  Before 1999, employers were not 
obligated to change practices that impeded women’s progress in the work place, a glaring example being the prohibition of long 
working hours for women, which had the effect of preventing most women from being promoted to higher managerial positions 
because those in managerial positions often work long hours.  The 1999 amendments prohibit any discrimination against 
women in recruitment, employment, job assignment, and promotion.  It also created a system of publicizing the names of 
corporations that do not comply with the law, as well as improved the mediation system.  In addition, the amended EEO gives 
employees the right to sue employers when mediation fails.  Japan has been making notable progress in strengthening the 
enforcement of equal employment laws since 1986, but needs to continue to make sure that the spirit of the EEO is met whole-
heartedly. 
  There are good signs for this.  Presidents of several leading companies, including IBM Japan and Ricoh, appear 
eager to promote female employees to higher managerial positions.  They have joined the Committee for Promotion of Female 
Employees organized by the Ministry of Welfare and Labor.  The Committee identified that the key to achieving their objective 
is the attitude of top executives.  The Committee found that there is a significantly positive relation between female managerial 
employees and profit.  It plans to publicize the names of companies with exemplary effort and achievements in this matter. 
  The second general policy is to assist women in building their labor market attachment by reducing employment 
interruptions as they go through child- bearing and rearing.  High-skilled and professional jobs require continued investment in 
human capital ⎯ indeed the skills depreciate from non-use.  For upper-level managerial jobs, especially in Japan where 
promotion continues to be largely internal, enduring employment relationships matter.  In such cases, work interruptions are 
detrimental to career advancement, and this is especially true in Japan, where interruptions often lead to changing employers.  
The relative improvement in US women’s wages during the 1980s and '90s was mainly due to an increase in the labor-market 
attachment of women, accounting for up to 50% of the increase in the female-male wage ratio between the 1970s and '90s 
(Blau and Kahn 1997). 
  Interruption in work experience may be one of the most serious issue affecting young Japanese women.  
Traditionally, Japanese women worked for several years after completing formal schooling, got married, and withdrew from the 
labor force.  After their children had grown, some mothers re-entered the labor force, but mostly working part-time.  Modern 
young women need to be able to become mothers and keep their jobs without penalty.  This is important because they are at 
the critical stage of acquiring employment-related human capital.  According to a survey of mothers of all children born between 
the 10
th and 17
th in both January and July 2001 (conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare), two-thirds of all 
working women gave up jobs on the birth of their first child.  Some 26% of birth-giving mothers were not working one year 
before childbirth but 74% were; six months after giving birth, 74% were not working.  Of women who had jobs a year before 
childbirth, 67% were no longer working.  Among women working full time a year before childbirth, only 37% had returned to 
their jobs within six months.  Interestingly, when the child was not the first, the proportion returning to work within six months 
was much higher, over 74%.  This suggests a greater need for extra income when there are two or more children.  (Data from 
JLB 2003 Jan.) 
  No single measure solves this issue.  Instead, multiple measures are needed.  One, obviously, is to increase the 
availability of affordable and conveniently located child-care facilities, as well as reducing work-hours that extend into the 
evenings.  Another measure is to develop off-site jobs using information technologies that allow women to work from home 
while caring for their young children. And, of course, fathers could become more active in child-rearing responsibilities, as they 
are encouraged to do in Scandinavian countries in particular. 
 
There are some specific measures that can be implemented quickly that will have an immediate positive effect on the 
desirability of woman working.  Japan has made considerable progress in reducing disincentives for wives in its tax laws, but 
significant disincentives remain in pension laws, employer practices, and unemployment insurance program.     
  Japan’s steadfast progress in addressing disincentives in its tax laws is noteworthy.  Until the 1986 reform, the tax 
law suffered from the “household-income reversal” phenomenon.  Here is why.  As long as the wife earned less than the 
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deduction of ¥380,000.  However, as the wife’s earnings rose above the threshold, the spousal deduction disappeared 
altogether.  As a result, once the wife passed the threshold earnings, the household take-home pay dropped even though the 
pre-tax household earnings rose.  In effect, the marginal tax rate on wife’s earnings jumped up once she passed the threshold 
earnings, at the margin discouraging wives from participating in the labor force.   
The 1987 reform eliminated the household-income reversal phenomenon.  In particular, as long as the husband 
earned less than ¥10,000,000 (about $97,000), he could take a spousal “special” deduction if the wife earned less than 
¥1,350,000 (about $13,000), with the amount of deduction declining with wife’s earnings.  However, the husband whose wife 
did not work could now take the spousal income deduction of ¥760,000, double the amount he could take before the reform, 
thereby increasing the disincentive for the wife to enter the labor force.  The tax law was further revised in 2004, and the 
spousal special deduction was eliminated for the husband whose wife earns less ¥1,030,000.  The spousal special deduction 
still exists if the wife earns above this threshold.  This reform effectively lowers the marginal tax rate on wife’s earnings above 
wife’s threshold earnings of ¥1,030,000, thereby increasing at the margin the wife’s incentive to work. \footnote 3 
{footnote 
 It should be noted that only in the last few years has the US substantially reduced similar disincentives in the US tax 
code (the "marriage penalty"), although the disincentives had been mitigated in earlier years for all but the very-upper-middle 
class and above by the widening of tax brackets and lowering of marginal rates. 
{end 
The disincentive persists, however, because of employer practices.  To understand this, bear in mind that, unlike in 
the US, a typical Japanese household headed by an employee husband does not file and pay income taxes.  Instead, the 
husband’s employer takes care of his/her employees’ income taxes.  As a result, the husband must report his wife’s earnings to 
his employer.  Now, many Japanese employers (almost 70 percent) pay spousal allowance as a part of compensation.  In 
many cases, however, such allowances disappear if the wife’s earning exceeds ¥1,030,000.  This is a source of disincentive for 
the wife to work. 
Japanese public-pension law also contains built-in disincentives for wives.  A wife whose husband is covered by the 
Employees’ Pension, which is a mandatory earnings-based pension system, receives her basic pension benefits, even if she 
does not pay into to the system as long as she works less than 75 percent of hours/days worked by a full-time worker with an 
annual earnings of less than ¥1,300,000 (about $12,000).  If she exceeds these threshold values, she must contribute to the 
system.  This provision is a source of disincentive for the wife at the margin.  Finally, a worker is exempt from paying into the 
unemployment insurance system if he/she works less than 20 hours per week.  Clearly, this provision lowers the real wage 




This chapter has identified some of the more serious labor-market problems facing Japan, some direct consequences of the 
macro-economy malaise during the past dozen years and others of a more long-term nature.  For some problems, we have 
offered concrete proposals, and for others we have identified issues that must be addressed to facilitate formulation of sensible 
solutions.  These are recapitulated here. 
  Poor macroeconomic conditions are primarily responsible for many of the problems taken up in this chapter, and 
have exacerbated others.  These include reduction of worker training and job satisfaction, increasing youth idleness and under-
employment, a rise of temporary and part-time employment, and gender and geographical gaps in employment and 
unemployment.  Once an economic recovery takes hold and generates strong, sustained growths in aggregate demand, 
employers will regain confidence and begin investing in long-term employees.  When that happens, many current unemployed 
and under-employed workers, as well as those who will continue to be displaced by the process of structural reforms, will be 
absorbed into productive, full-time employment.  The practice of “trial employment”, in which some workers, freeters included, 
initially hired as non-regular workers are promoted to the regular-workers status after proving themselves, is expected to 
expand as the economy rebounds.  Until then, any adjustment policies are unlikely to completely solve these basic 
employment-level problems. 
  One policy we recommend is to subsidize training of unemployed and displaced workers for emerging skills and jobs 
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less based on seniority, Japan will become less reliant on informal on-the-job training in which older workers trained younger, 
less experienced ones. 
  Japan would be well advised to redirect expenditures from public-works projects to investment in such proactive 
employment-promotion and employment-adjustment projects as job training, retraining, and mobility support.  Such redirection 
will help the economy keep up with a changing industrial structure and the geographical distribution of jobs. 
  In addition, the current arrangement in which job-training subsidies for the most part are given to firms offering in-
house job training must be re-examined.  A sound public policy instead may be to offer scholarship-type programs for job 
training and allow tax deductions for expenditures incurred on training and retraining.  Such a policy will help foster self-reliance 
on the part of the worker and promote competition among employers for trainable workers, thereby promoting efficiency of 
resource use. 
  We conjecture that there have been too few job separations in Japan relative to what is optimal.  We propose that 
measures be taken to promote efficient job separations in Japan by reducing cultural, legal, and policy biases against workers 
changing jobs and employers dismissing workers.  Employment protection practices, formal and informal, slow employment 
recovery.  Until employers gain confidence that favorable conditions in the economy will last, they will be reluctant to hire new 
workers, or recall laid-off workers, because they know that it is difficult to discharge employees in downturns.  Asymmetry of 
information between employers and employees must be reduced to minimize inefficient separations.  Improved communication 
and transparency between management and labor will help in this regard.  The goal is to promote an efficient matching of jobs 
with workers, 
  Japan faces a number of difficult long-term labor market issues.  The most challenging has to do with the aging of 
the population and the shrinking in the prime-age work force.  To deal with this, it is worth considering two alternatives.  One is 
to preserve homogeneity by continue to bar extensive “permanent” immigration.  The other is to give up homogeneity and allow 
immigration of carefully selected prime-age workers.  The aging of the population means that the mandatory retirement system 
must be re-examined and the age of eligibility for social security be made more flexible and later. 
  Discrimination against women persists in the labor market.  Japan has made considerable progress since the mid-
1980s in developing a legal framework for promoting equality between men and women in the work place.  A significant 
progress has been made in its tax laws to reduce disincentives for wives.  However, the current pension systems, employer 
practices, and unemployment insurance discourage wives from working full-time in high paying jobs.  These must be reformed. 
 Effort needs to continue, and indeed accelerate, so that Japanese women will enjoy increasing equality in employment 
opportunity, pay, and career advancement. 
  For all of the issues discussed here, the ultimate objective of policies should be to promote a nimble and flexible 
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